Export Controls on Chipmaking Tools Could Be Key to Slowing Chinese AI, US Panel Told
U.S. export controls on computing chips and chipmaking equipment are more likely to slow China's advances in artificial intelligence than in military modernization, a researcher said during a Feb. 6 hearing of the congressionally mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
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The military impact is expected to be limited because most current weapon systems rely on mature, lower performing chips that are not restricted or that can be obtained through domestic production or smuggling, said Hanna Dohmen, research analyst at the Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
The AI impact likely will be greater because some of China’s most advanced models still use U.S.-made chips, including ones that were stockpiled before controls took effect. Those stockpiles could last China a few years, at which point the controls “will start to bite more significantly,” she told the commission in written testimony. China could find ways around those controls, however, such as by connecting multiple less powerful chips to create higher-performing packages that can train and use AI models.
Slowing China’s AI development and deployment could depend highly on controlling equipment needed to make advanced chips, Dohmen asserted. “Currently, U.S. and allied controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment are likely more effective than the controls on chips themselves, in part because of the Biden administration’s multilateral approach,” which included working with Japan and the Netherlands (see 2412020016), she said. While China has made progress in chip design and manufacturing, its “fabrication capabilities remain heavily dependent on foreign equipment.”
To sustain export controls in the long run, the U.S. will need to do a better job explaining to allies why they are needed, as such restrictions traditionally have been used to control the development, production and use of weapons, she said.
Dohmen makes several other recommendations, including enhancing U.S. open-source intelligence collection and analysis of China’s chip and AI capabilities. She said the Commerce Department should conduct scenario planning exercises to evaluate, among other things, how proposed new controls might affect U.S. and allied firms and how China might respond to them. She wants the Bureau of Industry and Security to assess whether controls have met their goals, and she would give the agency a bigger budget to expand its analytical and enforcement capabilities.
Even if the U.S. pursues all these efforts, it can only slow, not stop, China's technological advances, which is why Dohmen believes the U.S. should make advancing its own capabilities its top priority. Export controls are "somewhere between useful and important, with the emphasis on the fact that we just need to focus on running faster here," she testified in response to a question.
Another hearing witness, David Lin, senior director for future technology platforms at the Special Competitive Studies Project, said export controls should be accompanied by restrictions on market access and inbound and outbound investment to maximize their impact. He also said that export controls are a "depreciating asset" that will gradually lose their effectiveness if not applied quickly.