Howard Buskirk

Most comments support an Enterprise Wireless Alliance petition at the FCC seeking modifications to Part 90 rules to eliminate the assignment of frequencies within the band's 809-816/854-861 MHz portion to specific pools of eligible entities (see 2402280033). Public safety groups opposed the change.

CTIA President Meredith Baker said that policymakers must reverse course to change how spectrum is allocated in the U.S., moving away from too much focus on unlicensed and not enough on full-power licensed spectrum. The U.S. has allocated three times as much unlicensed spectrum as licensed, she said during a CTIA 5G Summit Monday. Baker noted the national spectrum strategy's focus on the lower 3 GHz and 7/8 GHz bands. “The studies of these bands have to start immediately and examine all options,” she said.

A proposal that the FCC launch a rulemaking authorizing 5/5 MHz broadband deployments in the 900 MHz band received support in comments, which were due Thursday in docket 24-99. But commenters stressed that the relocation process must be voluntary, and that the rules must protect incumbents from harmful interference. The filings offer a snapshot of how 900 MHz is used today.

The 5G cycle is reaching the middle stages, with strong growth over the past two years, Ericsson executives said during a Mobile World Live webinar on Thursday. At the end of 2023, 63% of wireless subscribers in the U.S. were using 5G, which is “remarkable,” especially given the 42% reported a year earlier, said Peter Linder, head-5G marketing at Ericsson North America.

The federal government is progressing in its understanding of the extent of threats to federal technology systems, Eric Goldstein, executive assistant director-cybersecurity at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event late Wednesday. Other speakers noted private companies have slowly become more willing to share information when they experience a cyberattack.

The FCC released the text Thursday of a draft NPRM proposing to bar labs from entities on the agency’s “covered list” of unsecure companies from participating in the equipment authorization process. Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel and Republican Commissioner Brendan Carr announced the NPRM Wednesday. It will get a vote at the commissioners' open meeting May 23 (see 2405010073).

FCC commissioners will vote at their May 23 open meeting on an NPRM proposing labs from companies on the agency’s “covered list” of unsecure firms be barred from participating in the equipment authorization process. Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel and Republican Commissioner Brendan Carr announced the NPRM Wednesday. “This new proceeding would permanently prohibit Huawei and other entities on the FCC’s Covered List from playing any role in the equipment authorization program while also providing the FCC and its national security partners the necessary tools to safeguard this important process,” a news release said. “We must ensure that our equipment authorization program and those entrusted with administering it can rise to the challenge posed by persistent and ever-changing security and supply chain threats,” Rosenworcel said. The NPRM is “another significant step in the FCC’s work to advance the security of America’s communications networks,” Carr said: It proposes “to ensure that the test labs and certification bodies that review electronic devices for compliance with FCC requirements are themselves trustworthy actors that the FCC can rely on.” The NPRM builds on a 2022 order, which bans FCC authorization of gear from companies including Huawei, ZTE, Hytera Communications, Hikvision and Dahua Technology (see 2211230065). Last month, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded part of that order to the FCC to further develop the definition of critical infrastructure (see 2404020068). Commissioners will also consider an adjudicatory matter from the Media Bureau, and four items from the Enforcement Bureau as part of the abbreviated agenda, per Rosenworcel's note. She thanked other commissioners for their work on national security issues. “Working together, we have enacted and enforced rules to safeguard our wired and wireless networks from communications equipment that has been determined to pose an unacceptable risk to national security,” she said.

The term smart city can be useful for policymakers as they discuss using advanced communications and other tools to move cities forward, Bill Maguire, founder of Connected Communities, said during a Broadband Breakfast webinar Wednesday. Smart cities aren’t a destination, but a process, he said. Maguire believes individual cities must define smart city for themselves and act accordingly.

Developing rules for opening the lower 3 GHz band, a top focus of U.S. carriers (see 2404080063), won’t be easy, Monisha Ghosh, engineering professor at the University of Notre Dame and former FCC chief technologist, said during an RCR Wireless virtual test and management forum Tuesday. Much discussion at the forum centered on the challenges of performance testing in evolving 5G networks.

CTIA told the FCC that U.S. networks are secure in comments on a notice from the FCC Public Safety Bureau on providers’ implementation of security counter-measures to prevent the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the Signaling System 7 (SS7) and Diameter protocols to track the locations of consumers through their mobile devices. Comments were due Friday in docket 18-99. Major carriers emphasized that their systems were updated to address risks. That was also the industry message when the agency asked about Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council recommendations on diameter protocol security four years ago (see 2003120030). “U.S. providers’ commitment to security has resulted in U.S. networks being relatively more secure from legacy SS7 and Diameter risks than networks in other regions,” CTIA said. CTIA explained that technology is evolving. Legacy SS7 signaling is used today only in legacy 2G and 3G networks and Diameter in 4G and non-stand-alone 5G networks and “was deployed to help reduce risks associated with SS7 and is less susceptible to attacks,” the group said. Stand-alone 5G networks use HTTP/2 for signaling. Verizon said it knows of no successful attempts to access network user location data on its network using weaknesses in the SS7 or Diameter protocols since CSRIC’s adoption of best practices in 2018. “As Verizon explained in response to previous public notices relating to SS7 and Diameter security, in interviews with Commission staff, and in its responses to the Letter of Inquiry received from the Bureau” in October 2022 “we have implemented the relevant recommendations issued by the CSRIC and GSMA on signaling security,” the carrier said. As noted in previous filings, “AT&T has employed an aggressive, multifaceted approach to SS7 and Diameter security” and “continues to take significant, aggressive steps to protect the SS7 and Diameter networks including implementation of CSRIC’s working group recommendation,” the carrier said.